Thursday, February 28, 2013

Commodities Fall With Chinese Shares on Spending Cuts, PMI Data

from Bloomberg



Commodities Fall With Chinese Shares on Spending Cuts, PMI Data

Commodities fell for a fourth day and Chinese shares slid as $85 billion of American spending cuts were set to begin and data showed Chinese manufacturing weakened. Japanesegovernment bonds surged and the yen weakened after a report showed lingering deflation.
The Standard & Poor’s GSCI Index of 24 raw materials dropped 0.2 percent as of 2:24 p.m. inTokyo, set for a fourth week of declines in the longest streak since June. Copper lost 0.6 percent and oil fell 0.2 percent. The Shanghai Composite Index of shares sank 1.2 percent, S&P 500 Index (SPX) futures dropped 0.1 percent and FTSE 100 Index contracts slipped 0.3 percent.Japan’s 10-year bond yields sank to an almost 10-year low, while the yen weakened against major peers.
A pedestrian walks past an electronic stock board outside a securities firm in Tokyo. Photographer: Tomohiro Ohsumi/Bloomberg
China’s manufacturing slowed for a second month, Japan’s consumer prices dropped for the eighth time in nine months, and South Korea’s exports fell the most since July. The U.S. Senate rejected a pair of partisan proposals to replace the automatic across-the-board spending reductions which theInternational Monetary Fund says will hurt global growth. Data today may confirm Europe’s manufacturing contraction worsened.
“The Chinese data shows the economy is still expanding, the recovery is still on track, but clearly the momentum is not as strong as in previous cycles,” Yao Wei, Societe Generale SA’s China economist, said on Bloomberg Television’s “On the Move” with Rishaad Salamat. “It does show that there are still a lot of underlying structural problems with the economy.”
The dollar led gains in world markets last month, beating global measures of bonds,stocks and commodities, as the threat of U.S. budget cuts proved no barrier to investors snapping up American assets. Japan overtook China last year as the largest foreign holder of U.S. securities, including equities, asset- backed debt and Treasuries, the U.S. Treasury Department said.

Asian Stocks

The MSCI Asia Pacific Index of shares fluctuated while Japan’s Topix Index gained 0.7 percent, heading for the highest close since 2010. Australia’s S&P/ASX 200 Index and Hong Kong’sHang Seng Index both declined 0.4 percent. South Korean markets are closed for a holiday today.
Chinese shares declined before the start of the National People’s Congress next week. ThePurchasing Managers’ Index was 50.1 in February, the National Bureau of Statistics and China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing said today, compared with the 50.5 median estimate in a Bloomberg News survey and 50.4 in January. A separate PMI for China released today by HSBC Holdings Plc and Markit Economics was at 50.4 for February.

Spending Cuts

U.S. stocks erased gains in the final minutes of trading yesterday as investors prepared for rebalancing of benchmark indexes and spending cuts. The IMF, which currently expects 2 percent growth for the U.S. this year, will lower its forecasts for the world’s biggest economy because of the spending reductions, a spokesman said yesterday.
“In the near term we’re probably going to see markets struggling because of certain risks,” John Praveen, the chief investment strategist at Prudential International Investments Advisers, said on Bloomberg Television’s “Asia Edge.” “The U.S. sequester is clearly a risk and you have other risks in Europe. Strategically we remain quite bullish and after this period of correction, we should probably see another liquidity- driven rally especially in Japan.”
In Japan, benchmark 10-year bond yields touched 0.64 percent, the lowest since June 2003. The Bank of Japan (8301) may add monetary stimulus as early as April as prospective governorHaruhiko Kuroda looks to demonstrate a more aggressive approach to tackling 15 years of falling prices. The yen dropped 0.1 percent to 92.61 per dollar and 0.2 percent to 121.13 against the euro.

Euro, Commodities

The euro was poised for its longest stretch of weekly declines since June as European Central Bank President Mario Draghi said this week the bank is “far” from exiting stimulus measures. The final reading of a manufacturing gauge in the region fell to 47.8 in February from 47.9 in January, economists estimated before data today.
Commodities as measured by the S&P GSCI sank 4 percent in February, the worst monthly performance since October. Copper in London retreated for a second day, falling to $7,765.50 a metric ton, on concern China’s economic recovery may be losing steam. Nickel slipped 0.3 percent and aluminum lost 0.35percent.
Platinum for immediate delivery declined 0.5 percent to $1,575.25 an ounce, dropping for a third day. Palladium fell 0.4 percent to $725.70 an ounce. Gold lost 0.1 percent, reversing a 0.3 percent advance.
Oil in New York slid as much as 62 cents to $91.43 a barrel, the lowest intraday price since Dec. 31. Prices are headed for the first back-to-back weekly declines since November. Crude output by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries is set to increase for the first time in six months, a Bloomberg survey showed.
To contact the reporter on this story: Glenys Sim in Singapore at gsim4@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Rocky Swift at rswift5@bloomberg.net

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

New York Times March 14, 2010



Investors Who Foresaw the Meltdown

Published: March 14, 2010
The global financial crisis of 2008, which economists estimate could result in several trillion dollars of losses and which has already cost American taxpayers billions of dollars in government bailouts, was triggered not by war or recession but by a crazy, man-made money machine, built on flawed mathematical models that most financial executives did not really understand themselves. Greedy and heedless, Wall Street firms had been turning subprime mortgages — loans made to people with low creditworthiness or little documentation — into exotic, toxic financial products that they made a fortune laundering and reselling, and they were enabled in doing so by the very ratings agencies that were supposed to police risk. The insanity of this growing and highly leveraged trade in mortgage derivatives continued even as the quality of the underlying loans grew increasingly dubious, even as it became increasingly likely that the American housing bubble was going to pop.
Tabitha Soren
Michael Lewis

THE BIG SHORT

Inside the Doomsday Machine
By Michael Lewis
266 pages. W. W. Norton & Company. $27.95.
The clear and present danger posed by this deranged edifice built on the unstable foundation of subprime mortgages was not foreseen by the chief executives of America’s premier banks. It was not foreseen by government regulators, by Treasury officials or by the Fed. It was foreseen, however, by a handful of investors, who were aghast at the madness they saw on the Street and who used their prescience to make a fortune off the financial system’s calamitous meltdown. Some of their stories are told by Michael Lewis in “The Big Short.”
No one writes with more narrative panache about money and finance than Mr. Lewis, the author of “Liar’s Poker,” that now classic portrait of 1980s Wall Street. His entertaining new book does not attempt a macro view of the financial crisis, but instead proposes to open a small window on the calamities by recounting the stories of some savvy renegades who cashed in on their conviction that the system was rotten. In doing so Mr. Lewis faces the same problem that the Wall Street Journal reporter Gregory Zuckerman faced in “The Greatest Trade Ever,” his recent book about John Paulson, a hedge fund manager who made $15 billion in 2007 by shorting the housing bubble — the problem, namely, that the reader is put in the position of rooting for people who, while smarter or more farsighted than those who helped bring about catastrophe in the first place, were nonetheless trying to make money (who saw a rare opportunity, as one put it) by betting against the health of our financial system.
Still, Mr. Lewis does a nimble job of using his subjects’ stories to explicate the greed, idiocies and hypocrisies of a system notably lacking in grown-up supervision, a system filled with firms that “disdained the need for government regulation in good times” but “insisted on being rescued by government in bad times.”
Mr. Lewis argues that the roots of the meltdown of 2008 can be found in the 1980s of “Liar’s Poker,” when complex financial products like mortgage derivatives were developed. He also suggests that these financial instruments (which had names like “the synthetic subprime mortgage bond-backed C.D.O., or collateralized debt obligation”) grew increasingly opaque and complex to help obscure the fact that they were built around increasingly suspect loans: “low-doc or no-doc loans” requiring little documentation,adjustable-rate mortgages that ballooned after two years, “interest-only negative-amortizing adjustable-rate subprime” mortgages, and mortgages given to migrant workers and poor immigrants with little or no English.
As Mr. Lewis describes it, Wall Street firms were able “to hide the risk by complicating it” and by getting the rating agencies — notably, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s — to give triple-A ratings to bonds that were far lower in quality. Why, he asks, “were Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s willing to bless 80 percent of a pool of dicey mortgage loans with the same triple-A rating they bestowed on the debts of the U.S. Treasury?” Because, he suggests, Wall Street firms knew how to game the system; they knew how to get the rating agencies (which were eager to collect big fees for their services) to ineptly rate dangerous bonds. Most evaluation models, he observes, were based on rising house prices and used “the foreshortened, statistically meaningless past to predict the future”; this was how “the entire food chain of intermediaries in the subprime mortgage machine” was able to dupe itself.
Writing in faintly Tom Wolfe-ian prose, Mr. Lewis does a colorful job of introducing the lay reader to the Darwinian world of the bond market: “An investor who went from the stock market to the bond market,” he writes, “was like a small, furry creature raised on an island without predators removed to a pit full of pythons.” He draws equally lively portraits of the central characters in his story. All, he notes, were oddballs or outsiders — people impervious to groupthink and conventional wisdom, and each of them, he says, “told you something about the state of the financial system, in the same way that people who survive a plane crash told you something about the accident, and also about the nature of people who survive accidents.”
To begin with, there’s Steve Eisman, who had started out “a strident Republican” and was on his way “to becoming the financial market’s first socialist” as he grew increasingly convinced that “an entire industry, called consumer finance,” basically “existed to rip people off.” Mr. Eisman and his team “had a from-the-ground-up understanding of both the U.S. housing market and Wall Street,” Mr. Lewis writes, and by performing the sort of nitty-gritty credit analysis on mortgages (that should have been done before the loans were made in the first place), they realized that they could make a fortune by shorting the worst of the worst.
Then there is Michael Burry, a doctor with Asperger’s syndrome, who’d become obsessed with investing and started a fund with money from a small settlement his family received when his father died after a medical misdiagnosis. Dr. Burry immersed himself in studying the bond market in 2004 and became convinced that lending standards had declined so alarmingly that he could make money by shorting subprime mortgage bonds; by the end of 2007, Mr. Lewis reports, “he would have realized profits of more than $720 million” for his fund.
Finally, there is the “garage band hedge fund” started by Jamie Mai and Charlie Ledley in 2003 with a Schwab account containing $110,000 and housed in a shed in the back of a friend’s house in Berkeley, Calif. Mr. Ledley believed, Mr. Lewis writes, “that the best way to make money on Wall Street was to seek out whatever it was that Wall Street believed was least likely to happen, and bet on its happening.” In this case, his contrarian instincts told him, in Mr. Lewis’s words, that “the markets were predisposed to underestimating the likelihood of dramatic change.”
Four and a half years later the American economy was in trouble, and, Mr. Lewis says, the fund run by Mr. Ledley, Mr. Mai and their partner, Ben Hockett, would net more than $80 million.

NYTimes article Michael Lewis

from nytimes.com  September 2011




Touring the Ruins of the Old Economy




Michael Lewis possesses the rare storyteller’s ability to make virtually any subject both lucid and compelling. In his new book, “Boomerang,” he actually makes topics like European sovereign debt, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank not only comprehensible but also fascinating — even, or especially, to readers who rarely open the business pages or watch CNBC. The book could not be more timely given the worries about Europe’s deepening debt crisis and the recent warning issued by Christine Lagarde, managing director of the I.M.F, that “the current economic situation is entering a dangerous phase.”
Tabitha Soren
Michael Lewis

BOOMERANG

Travels in the New Third World
By Michael Lewis
213 pages. W. W. Norton & Company. $25.95.

Jake Guevara/The New York Times
Combining his easy familiarity with finance and the talents of a travel writer, Mr. Lewis sets off in these pages to give the reader a guided tour through some of the disparate places hard hit by the fiscal tsunami of 2008, like Greece, Iceland and Ireland, tracing how very different people for very different reasons gorged on the cheap credit available in the prelude to that disaster. The book — based on articles Mr. Lewis wrote for Vanity Fair magazine — is a companion piece of sorts to “The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine,” his bestselling 2010 book about the fiscal crisis. Like that earlier book its focus is narrow. It doesn’t aspire to provide a broad overview of the debt crisis but instead hands the reader a small but sparkling prism by which to view the problem, this time from a global perspective.
Mr. Lewis explains why the world is so worried that Greece could default: “If Greece walks away from $400 billion in debt, then the European banks that lent the money will go down, and other countries now flirting with bankruptcy” might easily follow, destabilizing regional and world economies further. He also explains why taxpayers in Germany — the euro zone’s largest economy, with resources critical to a rescue plan — are reluctant to keep bailing out other countries they regard as profligate, indolent and irresponsible.
This is why, Mr. Lewis writes, “European leaders have done nothing but delay the inevitable reckoning, by scrambling every few months to find cash to plug the ever growing holes in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and praying that bigger and more alarming holes in Spain, Italy and even France do not reveal themselves.”
How did this situation develop? In “Boomerang” Mr. Lewis captures the utter folly and madness that spread across both sides of the Atlantic during the last decade, as individuals, institutions and entire nations mindlessly embraced instant gratification over long-term planning, the too good to be true over common sense.
Greece, Mr. Lewis writes, ran up astonishing debts — from high-paying government jobsand generous pensions, as well as waste, bribery and theft — that came to “about $1.2 trillion, or more than a quarter-million dollars for every working Greek.” In just the last 12 years, he says, “the wage bill of the Greek public sector has doubled, in real terms” with the average government job now paying almost three times the average private sector job. Those who work in jobs classified as “arduous” can retire and start collecting pensions, he adds, “as early as 55 for men and 50 for women”; more than 600 Greek professions have somehow managed “to get themselves classified as arduous: hairdressers, radio announcers, waiters, musicians, and on and on and on.”
In the prelude to the 2008 economic meltdown, Mr. Lewis reports, British investors, lured by the prospect of 14 percent annual returns, “forked over $30 billion” to dubious Icelandic banks (“$28 billion from companies and individuals and the rest from pension funds, hospitals, universities and other public institutions” including Oxford University which “alone lost $50 million”). And property-related bank losses in Ireland, according to one Irish economist cited by Mr. Lewis, now come to roughly 106 billion euros; and since, Mr. Lewis says, a “handful of Irish politicians and bankers had decided to guarantee all the debts of the biggest Irish banks,” those losses “alone would absorb every penny of Irish taxes for the next four years.”
At times Mr. Lewis can sound a lot like Evelyn Waugh: shrewd, observant and savagely judgmental, dispensing crude generalizations about other countries, even as he pokes fun at himself as a disaster tourist. He asserts that Icelanders “have a feral streak in them, like a horse that’s just pretending to be broken” and suggests that Germans are “obsessed with cleanliness and order yet harbor a secret fascination with filth and chaos” which is bound to result in “some kind of trouble.” He is perhaps toughest on his fellow Americans, concluding that the 2008 economic meltdown stemmed in large part from “people taking what they can, just because they can, without regard to the larger social consequences.”
“It’s not just a coincidence that the debts of cities and states spun out of control at the same time as the debts of individual Americans,” he says, noting that states like California with ballooning pension obligations and employment costs face deficit problems not unlike those faced by Greece.
“Alone in a dark room with a pile of money, Americans knew exactly what they wanted to do, from the top of the society to the bottom,” he goes on. “They’d been conditioned to grab as much as they could without thinking about the long-term consequences. Afterward, the people on Wall Street would privately bemoan the low morals of the American people who walked away from their subprime loans, and the American people would express outrage at the Wall Street people who paid themselves a fortune to design the bad loans.”
In “The Big Short” Mr. Lewis focused around a handful of investors who were aghast at how the dangers of the subprime mortgage market were being ignored by bank executives and government regulators, and who used their prescience to make a fortune betting against the stability of the system. One of them — left “on the cutting-room floor” of that earlier book — was a hedge-fund manager named Kyle Bass, who by the end of 2008 had already moved on to a “new all-consuming interest, governments.”
Mr. Bass reasoned that the financial crisis wasn’t over, that, in Mr. Lewis’s words, “the bad loans made by highly paid financiers working in the private sector were being eaten by national treasuries and central banks everywhere,” which meant that entire countries could collapse. Months later, when entire countries did indeed start to go bust, Mr. Lewis asked himself, “How did a hedge fund manager in Dallas even think to imagine this strange world?”
In the course of “Boomerang” Mr. Lewis introduces us to other, “disturbingly prescient” people, like Morgan Kelly, a professor of economics at University College Dublin, who began noticing in 2006 that something seemed seriously out of whack with the Irish housing market. He also foresaw the collapse of Irish banks, which had lent staggering amounts of money to property developers during the Irish real estate bubble.
Among the other intriguing individuals in this volume there’s Stefan Alfsson, an Icelandic fisherman who in 2005 quit fishing and joined the stream of young people becoming bankers, setting himself up as “an adviser to companies on currency risk hedging” — without a day of training. And there are some canny Greek monks who built a vast real estate empire that set off a scandal that Mr. Lewis says helped bring down the government of Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis in October 2009. When a new government took over, it “found so much less money in the government’s coffers than it had expected that it decided there was no choice but to come clean”; those revelations panicked investors, and the new higher interest rates the country was forced to pay, Mr. Lewis says, “left the country — which needed to borrow vast sums to fund its operations — more or less bankrupt.”
Mr. Lewis’s ability to find people who can see what is obvious to others only in retrospect or who somehow embody something larger going on in the financial world is uncanny. And in this book he weaves their stories into a sharp-edged narrative that leaves readers with a visceral understanding of the fiscal recklessness that lies behind today’s headlines about Europe’s growing debt problems and the risk of contagion they now pose to the world.





Tuesday, February 26, 2013

On sequester, Boehner tells Senate to get "off their ass"

from cbsnews



House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, clearly frustrated with the lack of a solution to avert the sequester, which kicks in on Friday, let some frank language slip on camera today, pushing the Senate to act on dealing with the impending budget cuts.
The president "is going all over the country holding rallies instead of sitting down with Senate leaders," while, Boehner argued, "We have moved a bill in the House twice."
"We should not have to move a third bill before the Senate gets off their ass and begins to do something," he added.
The House bills that Boehner referred to would replace the across-the-board automatic cuts with more targeted cuts.  Meantime, Senate Democrats are pushing a plan that would replace the cuts with a mix of different cuts and tax increases, something the president supports but congressional Republicans do not.  
While the Democratic-led Senate is expected to act on that plan this week, it's all but guaranteed the Republican-led House's will continue to resist any plan that includes tax increases, hence, the continued stalemate.
President Obama heads to a shipyard in Newport News, Va., today to point out the effects the sequester will have on businesses and the military.
© 2013 CBS Interactive Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Sunday, February 24, 2013

Gloomy Italians vote in election crucial for euro zone

from Reuters


Gloomy Italians vote in election crucial for euro zone

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A nun casts her vote at a polling station in Rome February 24, 2013. REUTERS-Yara Nardi
ROME | Sun Feb 24, 2013 11:29am EST
(Reuters) - Italy voted on Sunday in one of the most unpredictable elections in years, with many voters expressing rage against a discredited elite and doubt that a government will emerge strong enough to combat a severe economic crisis.
"I am pessimistic. Nothing will change," said Luciana Li Mandri, 37, as she cast a ballot in the Sicilian capital Palermo on the first of two days of voting that continues on Monday.
"The usual thieves will be in government."
Her gloom reflected the mood across Italy, where many voters said they thought the new administration would not last long, just the opposite of what Italy needs to combat the longest slump in 20 years, mounting unemployment and a huge public debt.
The election is being closely watched by investors whose memories are fresh of a debt crisis which forced out scandal-plagued conservative premier Silvio Berlusconi 15 months ago and saw him replaced by economics professor Mario Monti.
"I'm not confident that the government that emerges from the election will be able to solve any of our problems," said Attilio Bianchetti, a 55-year-old building tradesman in Milan.
Underlining his disilluion with the established parties, he voted for the 5-Star Movement of comic Beppe Grillo.
An iconclastic, 64-year-old Genoese, Grillo has screamed himself hoarse with obscenity-laced attacks on politicians that have channeled the anger of Italians, especially a frustrated young generation hit by record unemployment.
"He's the only real new element in a political landscape where we've been seeing the same faces for too long," said Vincenzo Cannizzaro, 48, in Palermo.
Opinion polls give the centre-left coalition of Pier Luigi Bersani a narrow lead but the result has been thrown open by the prospect of a huge protest vote against Monti's painful austerity measures and rage at a wave of corruption scandals.
A weak government could usher in new instability in the euro zone's third largest economy and cause another crisis of confidence in the European Union's single currency.
Television tycoon Berlusconi, showing off unrivalled media skills and displaying extraordinary energy for a man of 76, has increased uncertainty over the past couple of months by halving the gap between his centre-right and Bersani.
"I am pessimistic. There is such political fragmentation that we will again have the problem of ungovernability" said Marta, a lawyer voting in Rome who did not want to give her family name. "I fear the new government won't last long."
Another Roman voter, lab technician Manila Luce, 34, said: "I am voting Grillo and I hope a lot of people do. Because it's the only way to show how sick to the back teeth we are with the old parties."
Voting continues until 10 p.m. (4 p.m. EST) and resumes on Monday at 7 a.m. Exit polls will be published shortly after polls close at 3 p.m. on Monday. Full official results are expected by early Tuesday.
Snow in the north was expected to last into Monday and could discourage some of the 47 million eligible voters. Authorities said they were prepared for the weather and in the central city of Bologna roads were cleared of snow before voting started.
TOPLESS FEMINISTS
Several bare-breasted women protested against Berlusconi when he voted in Milan. They were bundled away by police.
The four-time premier, known for off-color jokes and a constant target of feminists, is on trial for having sex with an underage prostitute during "bunga bunga" parties at his villa.
Most experts expect a coalition between Bersani and Monti to form the next administration, but whatever government emerges will have to try to reverse years of failure to revitalize one of the most sluggish economies in the developed world.
The widespread despair over the state of the country, where a series of corruption scandals has highlighted the stark divide between a privileged political elite and millions of ordinary Italians struggling to make ends meet, has left deep scars.
"It's our fault, Italian citizens. It's our closed mentality. We're just not Europeans," said voter Li Mandri in Palermo.
"We're all about getting favors when we study, getting a protected job when we work," she said. "That's the way we are and we can only be represented by people like that as well."
ECONOMIC AGENDA
Even if Bersani wins as expected, Analysts are divided over whether he will be able to form a stable majority that can force through sweeping economic reforms.
His centre-left is expected to have firm control of the lower house, thanks to rules that give a strong majority to whichever party wins the most votes nationally.
But a much closer battle will be fought for the Senate which is elected on a regional basis and which has equal law making powers to the chamber.
Berlusconi has clawed back support by promising to repeal Monti's hated new housing tax, the IMU, and to refund the money. He relentlessly attacked what he called the "Germano-centric" policies of the former European Union commissioner.
Think-tank consultant Mario, 60, said on his way to vote in Bologna that Bersani's Democratic Party was the only group serious enough to repair the economy: "They're not perfect," he said. "But they've got the organization and the union backing that will help them push through structural reforms."
Despite Berlusconi's success, Grillo has tapped into the same public frustration as the conservative tycoon and pollsters say his 5-Star Movement of political novices could overtake the centre-right to take second place in the vote.
Rivals have branded Grillo a threat to democracy - a vivid image in a country ruled by fascists for two decades until World War Two. Several voters who spoke to Reuters said Grillo was not the answer because of his lack of concrete policies and the inexperience of those who will sit in parliament for 5-Star.
"Grillo is a populist and populism doesn't work in a democracy," said retired notary Pasquale Lebanon, 76, as he voted for Bersani's Democratic Party in Milan.
"I'm very worried. There seems to be no way out from a political point of view, or for being able to govern," said Calogero Giallanza, a 45-year-old musician in Rome as he also voted for Bersani.
"There's bound to be a mess in the Senate because, as far as I can see the 5-Star Movement is unstoppable."
(Additional reporting by Cristiano Corvino, Lisa Jucca, Jennifer Clark, Matthias Baehr, Jennifer Clark and Sara Rossi in Milan, Stephen Jewkes in Bologna, Wladimir Pantaleone in Palermo, Stefano Bernabei and Massimiliano Di Giorgio in Rome; Writing by James Mackenzie and Barry Moody; Editing by Alastair Macdonald)