Monday, February 9, 2015

Nobody Understands Debt

from nytimes

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Many economists, including Janet Yellen, view global economic troubles since 2008 largely as a story about “deleveraging” — a simultaneous attempt by debtors almost everywhere to reduce their liabilities. Why is deleveraging a problem? Because my spending is your income, and your spending is my income, so if everyone slashes spending at the same time, incomes go down around the world.
Or as Ms. Yellen put it in 2009, “Precautions that may be smart for individuals and firms — and indeed essential to return the economy to a normal state — nevertheless magnify the distress of the economy as a whole.”
So how much progress have we made in returning the economy to that “normal state”? None at all. You see, policy makers have been basing their actions on a false view of what debt is all about, and their attempts to reduce the problem have actually made it worse.
First, the facts: Last week, the McKinsey Global Institute issued a report titled “Debt and (Not Much) Deleveraging,” which found, basically, that no nation has reduced its ratio of total debt to G.D.P. Household debt is down in some countries, especially in the United States. But it’s up in others, and even where there has been significant private deleveraging, government debt has risen by more than private debt has fallen.
You might think our failure to reduce debt ratios shows that we aren’t trying hard enough — that families and governments haven’t been making a serious effort to tighten their belts, and that what the world needs is, yes, more austerity. But we have, in fact, had unprecedented austerity. As the International Monetary Fund has pointed out, real government spending excluding interest has fallen across wealthy nations — there have been deep cuts by the troubled debtors of Southern Europe, but there have also been cuts in countries, like Germany and the United States, that can borrow at some of the lowest interest rates in history.
All this austerity has, however, only made things worse — and predictably so, because demands that everyone tighten their belts were based on a misunderstanding of the role debt plays in the economy.
You can see that misunderstanding at work every time someone rails against deficits with slogans like “Stop stealing from our kids.” It sounds right, if you don’t think about it: Families who run up debts make themselves poorer, so isn’t that true when we look at overall national debt?
No, it isn’t. An indebted family owes money to other people; the world economy as a whole owes money to itself. And while it’s true that countries can borrow from other countries, America has actually been borrowing less from abroad since 2008 than it did before, and Europe is a net lender to the rest of the world.
Because debt is money we owe to ourselves, it does not directly make the economy poorer (and paying it off doesn’t make us richer). True, debt can pose a threat to financial stability — but the situation is not improved if efforts to reduce debt end up pushing the economy into deflation and depression.
Which brings us to current events, for there is a direct connection between the overall failure to deleverage and the emerging political crisis in Europe.
European leaders completely bought into the notion that the economic crisis was brought on by too much spending, by nations living beyond their means. The way forward, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany insisted, was a return to frugality. Europe, she declared, should emulate the famously thrifty Swabian housewife.
This was a prescription for slow-motion disaster. European debtors did, in fact, need to tighten their belts — but the austerity they were actually forced to impose was incredibly savage. Meanwhile, Germany and other core economies — which needed to spend more, to offset belt-tightening in the periphery — also tried to spend less. The result was to create an environment in which reducing debt ratios was impossible: Real growth slowed to a crawl, inflation fell to almost nothing and outright deflation has taken hold in the worst-hit nations.
Suffering voters put up with this policy disaster for a remarkably long time, believing in the promises of the elite that they would soon see their sacrifices rewarded. But as the pain went on and on, with no visible progress, radicalization was inevitable. Anyone surprised by the left’s victory in Greece, or the surge of anti-establishment forces in Spain, hasn’t been paying attention.
Nobody knows what happens next, although bookmakers are now givingbetter than even odds that Greece will exit the euro. Maybe the damage would stop there, but I don’t believe it — a Greek exit is all too likely to threaten the whole currency project. And if the euro does fail, here’s what should be written on its tombstone: “Died of a bad analogy.”

Tuesday, February 3, 2015

Local Politics Are Fracturing European Unity

from nytimes



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Podemos supporters gather in Madrid. The anti-austerity leftist party, whose name means “We can,” has wider support than the traditional parties of Spain. CreditGerard Julien/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
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The euro had been enshrined in a treaty but not yet come to life in the autumn of 1997, when Martin Feldstein, the influential president of the National Bureau of Economic Research, published an essay arguing that European leaders’ hopes that a monetary union would foster greater harmony and peace in a Continent repeatedly ravaged by wars were misplaced.
It “would be more likely to lead to increased conflicts,” wrote Mr. Feldstein, a former chief economic adviser to President Ronald Reagan.
War within Europe, “would be abhorrent but not impossible,” he added. “The conflicts over economic policies and interference with national sovereignty could reinforce longstanding animosities based on history, nationality and religion.”
Needless to say, Mr. Feldstein’s sobering forecast was widely derided in Europe and even treated as beyond the pale by a number of economic commentators in the United States, including the editorial board of The Wall Street Journal.
It doesn’t look so outrageous these days. True, not all of his observations hit the bull’s-eye. He expected Europe’s monetary union to proceed toward deeper unification, including a common foreign and defense policy, and even a unified military. Interestingly, he feared a more assertive Europe might go to war with Russia if it were to invade Ukraine.
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A European Morass

Forced to accept tough austerity measures to raise money for their debt payments, countries along the periphery of the eurozone have fallen into a deep economic downturn. But with economic activity crimped, their debt load has increased rather than lessened.
Change in gross domestic product
per capita since 2008
+
10
%
Germany
United States
0
Portugal
Spain
Ireland
10
Italy
20
Greece
30
’08
’09
’10
’11
’12
’13
’14
Net government debt, as a share
of gross domestic product
200
%
Greece
150
Portugal
Italy
100
Ireland
Spain
50
0
’08
’09
’10
’11
’12
’13
’14
In a conversation last week, he clarified that the editors of Foreign Affairs, where the essay appeared, spiced up his account. What he meant at the time was that the euro, which went into effect in 1999, could aggravate tensions between member countries — leading to heated conflict but not to real armed war.
But despite the misses, the last five years have more than justified his conclusion: Tying together a set of disparate economies with rigid common rules that barred them from pursuing independent policies on government spending or interest rates was doomed to fail as soon as their economic fortunes diverged. No democratic political system could handle it.
To be fair, many economists — mostly on this side of the Atlantic — have long recognized the flaws of the euro area’s monetary arrangement. But still wedded to the notion of European solidarity, euro advocates failed to grasp the crucial, irreducible obstacle to their economic plan that Mr. Feldstein highlighted: Politics are still local.
“They made the mistake of thinking that a solution had to happen at the eurozone level rather than at the country level,” Professor Feldstein told me. “That anything they could do to increase the sense of European solidarity would be a good thing.”
Desperate Greek voters ignited the latest panic in Europe’s rolling crisis. Last week they elected a new populist government that promised to put an end to the drastic budget-cutting imposed by Europe in exchange for financial support.
But Greece is hardly the only problem. Political contagion is in the air. In Spain, “Podemos,” a left-wing party born last year out of anger at Europe, has surged in the polls ahead of general elections to be held later this year. If elected, it promises to write off much of Spain’s debt.
“The politics we see now are the result of an economic strategy,” said Paul De Grauwe, a former member of the Belgian Parliament now at the London School of Economics. “When you push countries to impose deep austerity policies, you shouldn’t be surprised that the unemployed push for extreme parties.”
The economics are pretty straightforward.
The euro area suffers, principally, from a lack of growth. Indebted countries on Europe’s periphery — which include not only Greece and Spain but also countries like Italy and Ireland — have been slashing their budgets, cutting jobs and trimming wages, hoping to lighten their burden of debt.
Germany, the biggest creditor country and main architect of the European Union’s strategy, argues that such austerity is an indispensable corrective for the boom years, when low interest rates fueled spending binges — in Greece by the government, in Ireland and Spain by the private sector.
But the traditional corrective hasn’t worked: Indebted economies are shrinking faster than their debt. “The killer incriminating fact is that for all the costs and all the pain, the debt-to-G.D.P. ratios are nevertheless much higher than before the crisis,” said Jeffrey Frankel of Harvard’s Kennedy School. “Even if you don’t care about the distress and the extremist governments, you haven’t even restored financial stability.”
Photo
Martin Feldstein, president of the National Bureau of Economic Research, wrote in 1997 that the European monetary union “would be more likely to lead to increased conflicts.”CreditJohn Locher/Associated Press
Fixing this is not impossible. The most direct way would be for the creditors in Europe’s north to relax the tight conditions on debtor countries, provide them with debt relief and allow them to spend more to kick-start growth. Alternatively, they might just invest more themselves, which would lead to higher wages and prices at home, encouraging more output in their poorer neighbors.
This path presents some political complications, however. Voters in Germany and other rich northern countries have no appetite for transfering resources to the vulnerable neighbors around Europe’s edge. And, comfortably insulated by their own prosperity and conditioned by memories of hyperinflation after World War I, they still fear higher inflation. Even the direst warnings of impending doom seem unlikely to shift the public mood.
And that sets the political constraint on the other end of the field. “The right policies would defuse the political crisis in the peripheral countries at the expense of intensifying it in Germany,” Mr. De Grauwe said. “It would prevent communists taking over in the south but would fuel the extreme right in the north.”
The eurozone might have been built differently. Simon Wren-Lewis of Oxford University argues that had governments been allowed to employ countercyclical fiscal policy — tightening budgets when the economy was expanding robustly and actively spending more when economies slowed — much of the present crisis could have been avoided.
Germany’s obsession with budget deficits prevailed, however.
That leaves the ball entirely in the court of the European Central Bank, which is institutionally sheltered from popular democracy, though certainly not unaware of the political environment.
The E.C.B. has kept the euro from collapsing over the last two years by acting as lender of last resort to its weakest members. It now hopes to stimulate growth through quantitative easing, buying up bonds to reduce long-term interest rates, much as the Federal Reserve has done in the United States.
But bond-buying, Mr. Feldstein argues, will have little impact. Long-term interest rates are already low.
Few other options fit within the political constraints.
Mr. Frankel suggests that the central bank buy United States Treasury securities, which would further devalue the euro and stimulate euro area exports. Mr. Feldstein proposes revenue-neutral tax incentives: accelerated depreciation of new investment, say, accompanied by higher corporate taxes. Governments might commit to future increases in the value-added taxtied to reductions in the income tax, to accelerate spending.
Could these ideas pull Europe from its morass? Perhaps, but the latest academic proposals seem a bit like clutching at straws. “They might not try it, or it might not work,” conceded Mr. Feldstein. “If so, there may be no solution to the euro crisis.”
What then? In a recent column, the Financial Times economist Martin Wolf argued that creating the eurozone was its members’ second-worst idea. Letting it break up would be the worst. If the euro is to survive, voters in not just Greece and Spain but most of all those in Germany and the Netherlands must be persuaded of the necessity of compromise. Nothing we’ve seen so far suggests they are.